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ABSTRACT
In 1988, the Iraqi regime executed the Anfal Genocide against its Kurdish population,
killing a conservative estimate of approximately 50,000 to 100,000 Kurds (Human Rights
Watch, 1993). This genocide involved the widespread usage of chemical weapons and marked a
highly traumatic moment in modern Kurdish history. As of today, little academic research has
been completed on the long-term medical and political consequences of exposure to chemical
weapons in the Kurdistan region.
This exploratory research aims to contribute to the body of literature on this topic through
interviews with medical professionals, Kurdish politicians, and non-governmental organization
employees that have expertise on the Anfal attacks and their aftermath. By following a semistructured interview format with the help of a native Kurdish translator when necessary, this
research project was able to collect novel information on the lasting legacy of chemical weapons
in Iraqi Kurdistan. The commentary included topics like how to medically and politically address
the aftermath of chemical weapons, and how chemical weapons changed Iraqi Kurdistan’s
healthcare system, societal relationships, and economy.
Data collected for the medical findings proposes that improvements to Iraqi Kurdistan’s
general medical infrastructure and emergency healthcare capacity are necessary to aid Anfal
survivors and the future safety of the nation. Evidence within the political findings suggests that
chemical weapons are not only detrimental to health, but also to the social, economic, and
international components of Iraqi Kurdistan’s politics. Overall, this project adds to the growing
body of literature that focuses on contemporary Kurdish affairs within the context of historical
violence.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 16, 1988, the Kurdish city of Halabja smelled of apples (Human Rights Watch,
1993). Unfortunately, the root of the aroma was far from agricultural. That day, infamously
known as “Bloody Friday,” approximately 3,200 to 5,000 Kurds perished in chemical attacks
perpetrated by the Iraqi military (BBC, n.d.). Gases and nerve agents, which coated the town
through an aerial advance, gave the area its lingering smell of fruit (Human Rights Watch, 1993).
Regrettably, the experience of Halabja was not unique. The fatalities occurred at a time when the
Iraqi government deployed chemical warfare on a regular basis in its counterinsurgency
campaign against the Kurds known as the Anfal Genocide or Anfal.
Anfal was a byproduct of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein’s longstanding hatred for
Iraq’s Kurdish population, and his ambition to crush the Kurdish insurgents (Human Rights
Watch, 1993). According to investigators of the Human Rights Watch (1993), Anfal raged from
February 23, 1988 to September 6, 1988. Death during this period of devastation stemmed from
multiple sources. As commonly seen in genocide, Anfal exhibited the targeted use of artillery
against noncombatants, including a notably atrocious “gendercide” marked by widespread
execution of Kurdish boys and men (Kurdistan Regional Government, n.d.). Anfal, however, was
distinctive from many previous genocides in its patterned usage of chemical agents as weapons
of mass destruction. With all methods of murder combined, it is estimated that the total fatalities
of Anfal conservatively range from 50,000 to 100,000 and possibly reach as high as 182,000
Kurds (Human Rights Watch, 1993; Kurdistan Regional Government, n.d.). While an
understanding of Anfal is incomplete without discussion of artillery usage and campaigns such
as the Kurdish “gendercide,” this research focuses on Anfal’s instances of chemical warfare.
1

This approach attempts to study the genocide from a narrower perspective and to generate
comprehensive analysis of the long-term implications of chemical weapons attacks on Kurdish
society.
Loss of life and the occurrence of injury, the immediate results of chemical warfare, are
clear points of conversation for Anfal and have been heavily covered by journalists and
investigative organizations alike. However, the long-term implications of exposure to chemical
agents have been less thoroughly considered. Since Anfal took place in 1988, a mere 32 years
ago at the time of this writing, countless survivors and descendants of survivors are presently
alive. It is said that these individuals offer a “living laboratory for studying the effects of
chemical weapons” (Hughes, 2002, p. 210). While the connotation of this statement may be
perceived as callous, for its insinuation that a group’s shared trauma renders their existence into
one as research subjects, upon further review it suggests a valuable point. Through their
experience with chemical brutality, the Kurdish provide a meaningful opportunity to gain insight
into the consequences of chemical weapons (CW) in a manner that may aid survivors of
chemical warfare in the future, should there be any.
In the examination of the enduring effects of CW, this exploratory research aims to
present an interdisciplinary angle, which assesses not only medical consequences, but also
political ones. In doing so, this analysis seeks to dissuade the opinion that no more than health is
majorly impacted by CW and to format advice for governments that may one day face similar
issues. Through this process, this research also helps to contextualize the current state of affairs
for the Kurds. In 2017, the Kurds living in Iraqi Kurdistan, the geographical emphasis for this
evaluation, attempted and failed to claim full separation from the Iraqi government through an
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independence referendum (Morris, 2017). This process, which will be further detailed within this
study, backfired and resulted in further infringement of the autonomous region’s political control
(Morris, 2017). Arguably, the dilemmas faced today by Iraqi Kurdistan in the pursuit of
sovereignty can be traced back to historical violence like Anfal. As this study outlines the
interdisciplinary consequences of CW and how society can prepare and recover from them, it
will also detail the strong linkages between Anfal’s CW and the Kurds’ unsatisfied desire for
national freedom.

3

BACKGROUND

Chemical Weapons
According to the United States’ Department of Homeland Security (n.d.), weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) are generally recognized as one of the following four categories:
nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical. In his time as the President of Iraq (1979-2003),
Saddam Hussein was accused of utilizing multiple types of WMD. Infamously, the United States
entered the 2003 Iraq War over false claims regarding the WMD capability of the Hussein
regime (Kessler, 2019). While Iraq no longer had nuclear, biological, and chemical capacity in
the early 21st century, the fact that Hussein mandated the usage of chemical WMD in the 1980s
is heavily substantiated by independent reporting and international intelligence (Kessler, 2019;
Hiltermann, 2007). The Anfal Genocide was far from the first instance of large-scale chemical
death and has proven to be far from the last instance, as the widespread usage of chemical
weapons in Syria has demonstrated. Historically, CW present a substantial and prevailing niche
in the realm of conflict, and for this reason they are a worthwhile topic of study.
Before detailing the extensive timeline of CW, the nature of what exactly constitutes one
must be described. According to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(n.d.), or OPCW, “a chemical used to cause intentional death or harm through its toxic
properties,” would qualify as a CW. Broadly, OPCW (n.d.) states that these weapons may fall
into five categories as distinguished by their modes of action and intrinsic qualities. The five
OPCW (n.d.) classifications include choking agents, blister agents, blood agents, nerve agents,
and riot control agents.
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Choking agents, like chlorine, are those that prey on the respiratory tract and may result
in the functional drowning of an individual through internal fluid build-up (Ganesan et al., 2010).
Blister agents, like mustard gas, are known to trigger dermatological, ophthalmological, and
pulmonary issues through the burning and blistering of areas touched by the toxic substances
(Geoghegan & Tong, 2006). Blood agents, like hydrogen cyanide, disrupt typical function by
interacting with the cellular components of blood that take part in oxygen transportation and may
lead to victim suffocation (Ganesan et al., 2010). Nerve agents, like sarin, inhibit
acetylcholinesterase, a crucial enzyme for the maintenance of normal synaptic communication,
and produce nervous overstimulation and potential paralysis (Geoghegan & Tong, 2006). Lastly,
riot agents, like pepper spray, cause coughing, tears, and generalized airway irritation (OPCW,
n.d.). OPCW (n.d.) notes that riot agents only meet the criteria for CW when utilized in warfare,
not when utilized as “domestic law enforcement.” This alludes to the fact that intent is crucial to
the determination of whether a CW has been employed, as the stockpiling, production, and
application of chemicals does not always meet CW qualification standards (OPCW, n.d.).
Evidence of chemicals as WMD dates much further back than most contemporary
conflicts and other forms of modern munitions. For example, arsenic-based weapons, which are
blood agents, rose to popularity in antiquity and were commonly used by the Chinese beginning
in 1000 B.C. and in 431-404 B.C. by the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War (Radke et al., 2014).
It was not until World War I, however, that CW deployment was so prevalent that the period is
often denoted in textbooks as the Chemist’s War (Fitzgerald, 2008). Both the Allied Powers and
the Central Powers were chemically offensive during this time and the major toxicants involved
included chlorine, mustard gas, and phosgene (Fitzgerald, 2008). Strikingly, “1.3 million
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casualties and approximately 90,000 deaths” are attributed to CW in World War I (Fitzgerald,
2008). The trend of fatalities rooted in chemical exposure continued after 1918, with incidences
such as Nazi gas chambers in World War II, Egyptian cocktails of mustard gas and nerve agents
against a Yemeni opposition in the 1960s, and Portugal’s usage of chemical agents in Angola,
Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau in the 1970s (Ghanei & Amini, 2010; Tezcür & Horschig,
2020).
More recent examples of chemical warfare are not limited to the Anfal Genocide, not
even when discussed within a solely Kurdish context. Since 2011, the state of Syria has
contained an ongoing civil war. As a means of repressing rebel forces, President Bashar al-Assad
and his military have carried out numerous CW attacks with substances such as the nerve agent
sarin (Lukey et al., 2019). A significant fraction of the Kurdish nation, which will be discussed in
greater detail, resides in Syrian territory. While these events are influential to the Kurdish
narrative, they are beyond the scope of this study, which concentrates on the Kurds within Iraqi
Kurdistan.
Acts exploiting the lethal properties of CW are not limited to state conduct. Non-state
actors, such as terrorist organizations, have also claimed chemical operations. In March 1995, a
doomsday cult called Aum Shinrikyo released sarin on the Tokyo subway system during
morning rush hour, killing 13 and harming thousands (BBC, 2018). Aum Shinrikyo had a
penchant for CW, as they were accused of a smaller sarin attack in 1994 and a failed hydrogen
cyanide attack in 1995 (BBC, 2018). It is not surprising that terrorist organizations are drawn to
CW as a means of destruction since they are “inexpensive and… relatively easy to produce,” and
yet they offer “mass casualties with small quantities” (Ganesan et al., 2010). This idea is
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reinforced by the readily available global stocks of chemical precursors and the fact that most
factories that process pesticides, petrochemicals, or detergents possess the basic equipment
necessary for CW manufacturing (Browne, 1988). For these reasons, CW are frequently referred
to as “the poor man’s atomic bomb” (Browne, 1988).
Recognizing the danger that chemical warfare presents in the post-Cold War period, the
international community has responded with multilateral agreements such as the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). According to the OPCW (n.d.), the managing organization of the
CWC enforcement, the convention seeks to do the following:
“to end the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons;
to prevent their re-emergence; to ensure the elimination of existing stocks of such
weapons; and, in so doing, to make the world safe from the threat of chemical warfare.”
Currently, there are 193 states that have pledged commitment to the CWC (OPCW, n.d.). This
list of member states includes Syria, which acceded the agreement in 2013 after backlash over
their use of CW in civil war (OPCW, 2013). Israel, Egypt, South Sudan, and North Korea are the
only states that have yet to ratify the CWC. Interestingly, the United States’ Department of State
(2019) reports, “with confidence,” that a Russian-backed Syrian regime has used CW at least
once since accession in an attack on the Syrian city of Douma in 2018. Russia, another pledged
member of the CWC, has additionally been accused of underreporting declared CW facilities for
OPCW monitoring (U.S. Department of State, 2019). These are just two of the many cases of
noncompliance accusations that have been circulated since the effective period of the CWC.
Noncompliance in multilateral agreements is a trend that can be followed throughout the
history of chemical warfare prevention efforts. The CWC was not the first disarmament
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agreement on the topic, nor was it the first to experience issues with member parties adhering to
rules (OPCW, n.d.). Notably, the 1899 Hague Convention against CW was reiterated at a second
member meeting in 1907, less than a decade before the start of the notorious Chemist’s War
(OPCW, n.d.). In 1925, the Geneva Protocol was established in response to World War I, only
for World War II to exploit chemical agents soon after. With the demise of previous multilateral
agreements and its own problems with noncompliance, the CWC may be looked upon with doubt
as an entity that could globally establish and enforce policies on WMD. For this reason, political,
academic, and professional investment in methods that help society to cope with the effects of
chemical warfare remain significant to civilians and governments everywhere.

The Kurds
The Kurdish narrative started long before Anfal. As the “largest nation in the world
without its own independent state,” the Kurds are a topic of contemporary complexity and are
highly influential to Middle Eastern geopolitical dynamics (Gunter, 2004, p. 197). This populous
and historically marginalized ethnic minority is geographically centered along the borders of
Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. In the geographical area known as Kurdistan, there are believed to
be 25-30 million Kurdish individuals (CNN, 2019). Kurds can also be found in other locations,
including many in the countries of the former Soviet Union and the West. Within the United
States, Nashville, Tennessee is a hub for Kurdish emigrants and descendants, earning it the
nickname “Little Kurdistan” (Kurdistan 24).
While this dispersal has led to widespread multilingualism, the main language of the
nation is Kurdish. Of the Kurdish dialects, Kurmanji and Sorani are the two principally spoken.
8

From a religious perspective, most Kurds follow the Sunni branch of Islam; however, other
religions, including Christianity, are practiced in the Kurdistan region. In terms of environmental
conditions, mountains dominate Kurdish topography. The mountains of Kurdistan are of deep
cultural importance since they have served as physical protection for the nation throughout its
history (The Kurdish Project, n.d.). It has been suggested that mountain barriers are integral to
how the Kurds have been able to “survive as a distinct ethnic group” in surroundings that are
often antagonistic (The Kurdish Project, n.d.). This thought has been echoed in literature, as a
popular proverb suggests that the Kurds have “no friends but the mountains” (Glavin, 2015, p.
57).
This proverbial idea stems from a consistent pattern of Kurdish oppression at the hands of
larger powers. For example, the “Kurdish Question,” the pondering of under what conditions the
Kurdish desire for representation and power can be satisfied, has its roots in the closure of World
War I (Tezcür, 2019). When the Ottoman Empire fell in the aftermath of the war, the Kurds
nearly achieved autonomous recognition through a document called the Treaty of Sèvres. The
treaty, drafted in 1920 by the Allied powers and imposed over the highly weakened Ottoman
Empire, proposed redistributing Middle Eastern land in a way that would have provided for a
Kurdish region with European influence. The treaty never came to fruition due to a refusal by
Turkish nationalists, and instead the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne was enacted. Unlike the Treaty of
Sèvres, the Treaty of Lausanne awarded the complete Anatolian Peninsula to the nascent Turkish
state, without the foundation of a Kurdish state.
While the prospect of a formal Kurdish homeland has not been fulfilled, Kurds have
found varying degrees of self-rule in Iraq and Syria. Iraqi Kurdistan is a semi-autonomous region
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that is home to nearly 6,000,000 individuals. This population increased in recent years with an
influx of refugees and internally displaced people escaping violence caused by the Islamic State
and the Syrian civil war. The area covered today by Iraqi Kurdistan was heavily impacted by
Anfal, which is why it is the focus of this study. Iraq’s 2005 constitution officially recognized
Kurdish semi-autonomy; however, many tensions between the Iraqi government and the
Kurdistan Regional Government, which controls Iraqi Kurdistan, exist. Arguments over the
ownership of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, which was captured by the Iraqis in October 2017, and
Kurdish sovereignty are especially fervent.
Like the Treaty of Lausanne, recent events have furthered dismissal of Kurdish
autonomy, such as the failed Kurdish independence referendum of 2017. The referendum, which
92% of Northern Iraqi voters supported, was effectively nulled after the Iraqi government
responded with punitive and military action, including the closure of Kurdish airspace (BBC,
2017). The Kurds had anticipated support from the United States, after allying with them in
numerous conflicts like the fight against the Islamic State, but the United States instead did not
support Kurdish independence (Ottaway, 2017). Turkey, Iran, and Syria, the other three major
countries with significant Kurdish population, were strongly against the independence
referendum for the fear that it could inspire their own Kurds to seek self-representation. It is said
that this knowledge and a desire to act strategically in the Middle East, is what led the United
States to arguably betray their ally (Ottaway, 2017). Since then, the United States has pulled
further away from the Kurds by removing most American troops from the Kurdish-controlled
territory in northern Syria, a decision which paved the way for a Turkish incursion and led to the
angry resignations of multiple American military officials (Schmitt, 2019). As with the aftermath
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of World War I, the Kurdish nation is currently at the mercy of a difficult geopolitical situation
and international friendships that give way in the face of Kurdish desire for sovereignty. With
these obstacles, it is difficult to imagine that the Kurds will soon receive the homeland once
promised to them in a forgotten treaty many years ago.

The Iran-Iraq War
To understand the Anfal Genocide, it is necessary to understand the Iran-Iraq
War, which waged from 1980-1988. In September of 1980, an Iraqi invasion of Iran incited the
war. The attack came at a turbulent time for the new Islamist regime in Iran, which took over
under the guidance of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. Iraqi advancement in 1980 may be viewed as
opportunistic, as it preyed on the unpreparedness and chaotic nature of the new Iranian
government. Officially, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein claimed that the reason for the war was
“a territorial dispute over the Shatt al-Arab,” which is a waterway between Iran and Iraq (Hardy,
2005). However, some political analysts propose that Hussein felt personally threatened by the
Iranian revolution, which reestablished the importance of Shi'ism, and that he worried it would
inspire rebellion within his country’s domestic Shiite majority (Hardy, 2005). Though the war
lasted for eight years, it did relatively little other than cause destruction, both to property and life.
Estimates declare that anywhere from half a million to 1,500,000 lives were lost between the two
opponents (Hardy, 2005).
Throughout the eight years of conflict, both Iraq and Iran relied on various military
methods to gain strategic advantage; however, each side had distinctive tactics that led much of
their approach. For the Iranians, one tactic was known as the “human-wave” (Harris & Aid,
11

2013). At the start of the war, Iran’s population of nearly 39 million was almost triple Iraq’s
population of 13.6 million (World Bank, n.d.). Khomeini hoped that Iran could utilize its
demographic resource of motivated and largely unprepared young recruits to face Iraqi forces
and to defeat them by sheer number (Hiltermann, 2007).
To counter the demographic superiority of Iran, Iraq relied on chemical weapons (CW) in
addition to typical artillery (Harris & Aid, 2013). Chemical weapons were the military solution
of Iraq’s choice because they are relatively cost-effective, compared to typical ammunition, and
they provide a psychological fear that Iraq hoped would discourage future human-wave
participants (Hiltermann, 2007). The war’s chemical barrier was broken by Iraqi testing of tear
gas on Iranian troops in 1982 (Hiltermann, 2007). Since the context was within war, this riot
control agent would have situationally qualified as a chemical weapon (OPCW, n.d.).
Encouraged by the psychological distress it observed in Iranian troops, Iraq progressed to
mustard gas, a blister agent, in the summer of 1983 (Hiltermann, 2007). Aside from inflicting
mental and physical harm, the equipment meant to protect against CW significantly slows down
troops (Wade, 2003). This fact furthered the usefulness of CW for the Iraqi military.
Shortly over a year later, in the winter of 1984, Iraq became the first recorded entity to employ
nerve gas on a battlefield, which it did with the fruity-smelling nerve agent tabun (Hiltermann,
2007).
Although members of the Iraqi regime publicly accused Iran of also using chemicals in
retaliation, there is “no convincing evidence that Iran ever used chemical weapons” in the IranIraq War (Hiltermann, 2007, p. 157). Structurally, many chemical agents are gas molecules.
Subsequently, the spread of CW is notoriously hard to control in wars fought between sides
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located in close proximity to each other. This was seen in World War I when soldiers of both the
Allied and Central Powers suffered consequences of chemicals they helped to deploy (Perry,
2017). This phenomenon is known as “blowback,” and for the Iraqis it was likely the result poor
attack planning and shifts in wind patterns (Perry, 2017; Hiltermann, 2007).
Chemical attacks on the Iranians served as training grounds for chemical attacks on Iraq’s
own Kurdish citizens. A historical overview of the relationship of the Kurds and Iran throughout
the Iran-Iraq War helps trace the roots of the Iraqi decision to envision and execute Anfal, which
they considered to be a counterinsurgency campaign (Human Rights Watch, 1993). During the
1980s, and still to this day, two political parties dominated Iraqi Kurdish politics. Those parties
are the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
The KDP, which was established in the 1940s and is spearheaded by the Barzani family,
was eager to ally with Iranian forces as early as 1983, five years before Anfal began (Hiltermann,
2007). This alliance, inspired by the KDP’s hope of achieving greater autonomy and lessening
Iraq’s long-standing oppression of the Kurds, was met with harsh consequences from the Iraqi
government. When Saddam’s regime learned of the partnership, which helped the Iranians
emerge victorious from the important battle of Haj Omran, they sent forces to abduct “between
five and eight thousand Barzani men” in July of 1983 (Hiltermann, 2007). The men, who were
never seen again, were mass executed (Kurdistan Memory Programme, n.d.). This massacre was
met with little to no international outcry, which some retrospectively say could have discouraged
future attacks against civilians by Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 1993).
The Talabani family’s PUK, on the other hand, was not as initially enthusiastic about
cooperating with Iran (Hiltermann, 2007). This apprehensiveness was likely due to its
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partnership with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I), which fought against the
Iranian regime and relied on support from Saddam (Izady, 1992). At one point, the PUK even
considered aligning with the Iraqi government after repeated attempts by Iran to infringe on the
KDP-I (Hiltermann, 2007). However, after 1984 negotiations with Iraq over Kirkuk soured, the
PUK was eventually pushed into the arms of Iran – who was willing to offer much-needed
medical supplies and another avenue toward claiming Kirkuk (Hiltermann, 2007). While Saddam
publicly pointed to Iranian-Kurdish partnerships as justification for Anfal, Iraq has a historic
pattern of Kurdish discrimination, including significant anti-Kurdish violence in the 1970s
(Human Rights Watch, 1991). These accusations later became Saddam’s attempt at
legitimization of Anfal, a horrific genocide of the Kurdish people.

The Stages of Anfal and the Role of the International Community
To suffocate the Kurdish forces, Saddam appointed his cousin and previous commander
of the Iraqi secret police, Ali Hassan al-Majid as the lead on operations (Kelly, 2007). Al-Majid,
a kindred spirit of World War II’s Josef Mengele, later became known as “Chemical Ali” for his
role as the director of Anfal (Kelly, 2007). Anfal began on February 23, 1988, with the signing
of an Iraqi Defense Ministry order detailing plans of Kurdish “purification” and an attack on
Sergalou-Bergalou, the headquarters of the PUK at that time (Human Rights Watch, 1993; BBC,
2007). Following a multi-week siege of Sergalou-Bergalou, which involved CW, one of the most
infamous events of Anfal occurred: the Halabja Massacre (Human Rights Watch, 1993). It
should be noted, that throughout all of the mentioned chemical attacks, violence without
chemicals was also pervasive in Anfal.
14

On March 16, 1988, Halabja, a town in the southeast of modern Iraqi Kurdistan, was
subjected to a conventional airstrike followed by a chemical gassing at the hands of the Iraqi
forces (BBC, 2007). Halabja had been recently liberated from Iraqi presence by the Iranianbacked peshmerga, the name of the Kurdish military that means “those who face death” (BBC,
2007; Hiltermann, 2007). The conventional airstrike’s destruction allowed the later
dissemination of gases to seep into broken shelters and homes and to fill them with deadly
toxicants that smelled of apples (Human Rights Watch, 1993). According to reports of the United
States’ Department of State (2003), around 5,000 citizens died in Halabja, while “10,000 more
were blinded, maimed, disfigured, or otherwise severely and irreversibly debilitated.”
Over the next six months, seven further stages of Anfal followed with the final stage
ending on September 6, 1988 (Human Rights Watch, 1993). New stages corresponded to shifts
in the Iraqi government’s concentration on different areas of peshmerga control (Hiltermann,
2007). Chemicals had a distinct function in the Anfal Genocide. Not only did they serve as
vectors of violence, but each large-scale chemical attack also marked the first day of a new Anfal
stage (Hiltermann, 2007).
Many of the details of Anfal are debated, as survivor testimonial is a large source of
evidence due to the difficulties of widespread independent reporting in wartime. For example,
details of which chemical agents were used in Halabja, and other massacres, were highly
controversial (Hiltermann, 2007). After much argument within the international medical
community, using human samples and photographs, it was determined that the CW operated in
Halabja and the rest of Anfal primarily included a cocktail of mustard gas and various nerve
agents like sarin, tabun, and VX (Hiltermann, 2007; U.S. Department of State, 2003). Also
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controversial was the question of how aware and involved the international community had been
during the genocide.
During the acts of genocide, the international community allegedly knew relatively little
about Anfal and its victims. David Newton, the US ambassador who worked in Baghdad at the
time of Anfal, claimed that the United States inferred Iraqi conflict with the Kurdish, but was
“surprised later when they discovered the scale and intensity of the brutality” (Hiltermann, 2007,
p. 138). However, declassified Central Intelligence Agency documents include mentions of
regular briefings regarding the extent of CW usage against the Kurds, which directly contradicts
Newton’s statements (Harris & Aid, 2013).
In fact, further declassified information, paints a convincing picture of complicity of the
United States in the Iraqi chemical warfare. At one point, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
even shared satellite imagery with the Iraqis to warn them about an upcoming Iranian offensive
that targeted a weak point within their military’s distribution (Harris & Aid, 2013). The logic
behind these ploys by the United States can be summed up with one quote by former Secretary
of Defense Frank C. Carlucci in which he said, “Iranian victory is unacceptable” (Harris & Aid,
2013). These sentiments were likely because pre-revolution, Iran used to be an American ally in
the region. However, as the new Iranian regime espoused an ideologue of anti-Americanism, the
United States saw Iraq as a “defense against the Islamic revolution” (Hiltermann, 2007, p. 45).
With these thoughts in the American mind, the lives of the Kurds and how they were affected by
Iraq’s wartime progression were set aside for the assurance of containing Iran.
The United States is not the only member of the international community that had
knowledge of and complicity in the Kurdish genocide. Overall, there was a lack of meaningful
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reaction to the Iraqi government’s CW strategy, both against the Iranians and the Kurds, which
was a source of anger for many involved. Since there was a dearth of real-time investigation on
the chemical usage, and pressure by the United States and its allies on the United Nations
Security Council, in presidential statements, the UN often condemned both Iran and Iraq for
participating in chemical warfare (Hiltermann, 2007). This dual blame infuriated the Iranian
government, which was never proven to have used chemical weapons, and potentially
encouraged the Iraqi regime that the global community was willing to turn a blind eye; thus, the
statements arguably had no impact on saving lives (Hiltermann, 2007).
Additionally, the West was complicit in the genocide through their business with the Iraqi
regime in chemical precursors and equipment (Harris & Aid, 2013). For instance, Western
countries including the United States, Italy, Germany, and Britain, all made arms deals with Iraq
around the time of Anfal, some of which were specifically chemical (Dobbs, 2002; Harris & Aid,
2013). To demonstrate this truth in a particularly remarkable statistic, in 1988 the U.S.-based
Dow Chemical Company sold “$1.5 million of pesticides to Iraq,” which could easily have
served as CW precursors (Dobbs, 2002).
In the years following Anfal, some advancements in the study and documentation of the
topic, such as Human Rights Watch’s respected and extensive official report, did work to
illuminate the issue in the public eye. However, today, international coverage of the victims of
Anfal is largely nonexistent. This ignorance arguably correlates with the precarious modern
geopolitical situation of the Kurds, as governments are hesitant to acknowledge Kurdish
tragedies and desires for fear of raising ire from the four countries that control the sovereignty of
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Kurdish geography. The Kurds, on the other hand, commemorate the events of Anfal annually
and describe them as central to their pursuit of independence from the Iraqi government.
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ASSESSING THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF ANFAL
Prior to novel data collection for this research, the current body of literature on the
medical and political consequences of chemical warfare during Anfal was analyzed. This process
encountered difficulties with the present situation of Kurdish development. Medical review had
hurdles due to the lack of databases common in Western countries. For example, Iraqi Kurdistan
does not have a national cancer registry to track statistics relevant to cancer over time (Zibari,
2020). Political review, on the other hand, was influenced by the lack of Kurdish statehood. Not
only is Iraqi Kurdistan’s semi-autonomy relatively new when compared to Kurdish history, but
political reporting on Kurdish affairs is often suppressed by other Middle Eastern governments.
Without certain scientific institutions and the bulk of research that comes from long-term
governmental sovereignty, research on the Kurds deals with constraints that many other topics
would not face. In comparison, the 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system, a one-day
affair in a more developed nation, has no shortage of scholarly studies that meet international
research standards.
This limitation impacted the medical literature review far more than the political
literature review. In response to this, the literature review within this study leans on articles from
respected peer-reviewed journals on the general consequences of chemical weapons to provide a
foundation for the research into Anfal-specific facts. As supplemental evidence, peer-reviewed
medical research on specific incidences of non-Anfal chemical warfare has been included. At the
end of each section within the medical review, context from journals and researchers local to
Kurdistan has been incorporated, with the stipulation that the reader understands the unique
obstacles in scientific methodology that stem from a regional lack of resources. Given this
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caveat, Kurdish scientists are diligently working to improve the scientific tools available to them
(Moreno-Walton, 2020). Through the building of databases and partnerships with reputable
foreign research institutions, Kurdistan-based medical research will progress and gain further
international recognition.
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Medical Literature Review
Table 1. Long-Term Medical Effects of Mustard Gas and Nerve Agents.
Component of Health
Non-exhaustive List of Conditions
Experienced
Eyes
Mustard gas:
Refractive errors (like astigmatism), keratitis,
and blindness (Riazi et al., 2004; Ghasemi et
al., 2009; Balali-Mood & Hefazi, 2005)

Skin

Respiratory System

Nerve agents:
Impaired visual ability through nervous
system dysfunction (Egoz et al., 2017)
Mustard gas:
Burns, blisters, scarring, necrosis, hyper- and
hypopigmentation, hypersensitivity, chronic
dryness, and disfigurement (Balali-Mood &
Hefazi, 2005)
Mustard gas:
Edema of respiratory tissue, epithelial
necrosis, chronic bronchitis, asthma,
bronchiectasis, airway narrowing, pulmonary
fibrosis, chest pain, and respiratory failure
Nerve agents:
Respiratory paralysis, bronchosecretion,
bronchoconstriction, and chest pain

Cancer

Reproduction

Mental Health

(Balali-Mood & Hefazi, 2005; Ganesan et al.,
2010)
Increased rates of hematological cancers, such
as leukemia and lymphoma (Othman et al.,
2011; Godsen, 1998)
Decreased fertility, increased congenital
abnormalities in children, increased
miscarriages, and increased perinatal deaths
(Abolghasemi et al., 2010; Godsen, 1998)
Posttraumatic stress disorder, “poor general
functioning,” depression, anxiety, personality
disorders, and behavioral conditions (BalaliMood & Hefazi, 2005; Dworkin et al., 2008;
Ahmad et al., 2000; Kawana et al., 2001)
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Blister agents and nerve agents were the most frequently employed methods of chemical
warfare during Anfal, and their lasting medical effects have been significant to the Kurdish
population. When considering the major medical consequences of CW, two categories of
literature frequently arise: those that detail the somatic effects and those that detail the
psychological effects. As noted by many of the articles, it is important to remember that the mind
and body are inextricably connected. In fact, there is an entire field of medicine, known as
psychosomatic medicine, which champions the study of the relationship between psychological
factors and physical illness (Fava & Sonino, 2010). With this premise acknowledged, it is
important to understand this literature review from a holistic viewpoint. Though each research
team may focus on certain areas of health, each area undoubtedly affects others. Furthermore, the
full body of general research on chemical agents and health is extensive, therefore this should be
considered a detailed synopsis rather than a complete overview.
As mentioned in the discussion of OPCW’s (n.d.) chemical agent categories, the eyes are
vulnerable organs during chemical warfare. This is especially true when blister agents have been
implemented (OPCW, n.d.). Mustard gas, a blister agent, was a major player in Iraq’s Kurdish
genocide (Hiltermann, 2007). Thus, many Kurdish survivors struggle with ophthalmological
issues (Godsen, 1998). Among the long-term eye disorders reported after mustard gas exposure
are refractive errors (like astigmatism), keratitis, and blindness (Riazi et al., 2004; Ghasemi et al.,
2009; Balali-Mood & Hefazi, 2005). Sarin and VX, nerve agents utilized in Anfal, have also
been shown to cause impaired visual ability through parasympathetic nervous system
dysfunction (U.S. Department of State, 2003; Egoz et al., 2017). In a study completed in 2000 by
the University of Duhok in Iraqi Kurdistan, 57.5% (n = 40) of the research subjects, who were
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survivors of the Halabja massacre, experienced long-term ophthalmological concerns (Hama et
al., 2008).
Aside from the eyes, skin is another external structure of the body that is commonly
altered by CW (OPCW, n.d.). Many of the skin disorders caused by chemical warfare are acute
in nature, such as blisters and burns (Ganesan et al., 2010). However, the severity of injury to
skin is related to the duration of exposure (Balali-Mood & Hefazi, 2005). After multiple
exposures, prolonged exposure, or in some cases singular brief incidence, mustard gas can lead
to enduring problems such as scarring, necrosis, hyper- and hypopigmentation, hypersensitivity,
and chronic dryness (Balali-Mood & Hefazi, 2005). Unfortunately, physical skin disfigurement
is a difficult issue to fix in Iraqi Kurdistan, as the region has a shortage of the specialized
surgeons that would complete reconstructive operations (Godsen, 1998). Of the 40 Halabja
survivors surveyed by the University of Duhok in 2000, 12 years after the massacre, 50%
reported lasting dermatological problems (Hama et al., 2008).
Of the three most common areas of concern for the health effects of chemical agents,
eyes, skin, and the respiratory tract, the third is the subject of a substantial amount of research.
Seeing as how people are more likely to die from chronic breathing problems than eye and skin
irritation, this makes sense. Both blister agents and nerve agents can have detrimental impact on
the respiratory system (OPCW, n.d.). As a baseline, nerve agents can cause respiratory paralysis
and blister agents can induce edema of respiratory tissue (Ganesan et al., 2010). Physiologically,
this results in conditions like epithelial necrosis, respiratory distress syndrome, chest pain,
chronic bronchitis, asthma, bronchiectasis, airway narrowing, pulmonary fibrosis,
bronchosecretion, and bronchoconstriction (Balali-Mood & Hefazi, 2005; Ganesan et al., 2010).
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With the vast number of respiratory medical issues caused by CW, it is not surprising that 75%
of the 40 Halabja survivors in the University of Duhok’s study suffer chronic respiratory
illnesses (Hama et al., 2008).
Regardless of warfare, cancer is considered a leading cause of death globally. In 2008,
the World Health Organization reported that cancer alone was responsible for 13% of annual
deaths (World Health Organization, n.d.). Within populations that have suffered CW attacks,
many scientists suggest that the incidence of cancer is much higher (Godsen, 1998; Othman et
al., 2011). Through her fieldwork with survivors of Anfal, Dr. Christine Godsen suggests that
cancer rates in Halabja were “at least three to four times greater” than global averages “even 10
years after the attack” (Godsen, 1998). A research team in Iraqi Kurdistan investigated this claim
by compiling the cancer registries of nine Iraqi Kurdish hospitals, and cross-checking them for
duplicated patients that would normally be caught by a national cancer registry (Othman et al.,
2011). They determined that not only was there an increased risk of cancer in Iraqi Kurdistan,
but specifically hematological cancers showed highly increased rates (Othman et al., 2011).
Although this research team did not have access to typical cancer databases expected in Western
cancer research, they argue that their collection methods were valid and that their limitation in
methodology “does not nullify the data” (Othman et al., 2011, p. 1264). Dr. Godsen’s medical
analysis of the area included notes on a rise in leukemia and lymphoma, which are hematological
cancers (Godsen, 1998).
Aside from conditions that principally affect the survivors of chemical attacks, there are
side effects of CW that also affect descendants of the survivors through abnormalities related to
reproduction. In a study on the children of Iranian men exposed to mustard gas, it was found that
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the children experienced rates of congenital malformations and respiratory diseases that were
significantly greater than the children of Iranian men not exposed to mustard gas (Abolghasemi
et al., 2010). Among the Iranian men participating, it was also determined that five of them who
had been fertile prior to exposure became infertile after exposure (Abolghasemi et al., 2010).
Further, anecdotal evidence from medical professionals and researchers adds to the body of
literature supporting the idea that CW may lead to reproductive problems. For example, in Dr.
Godsen’s analysis of Halabja, she also reported a high infertility among the population, along
with high numbers of miscarriages and perinatal deaths (Godsen, 1998). Lastly, in her thorough
collection of interviews with Anfal survivors, Dr. Choman Hardi discovered stories of women
who gave birth to stillborn babies after gas attacks occurred during their pregnancies and of
women with young children at the time of the attacks who then grew up to be mentally delayed
(Hardi, 2011).
While there are multiple fields of medicine left that could be considered in the context of
CW, such as cardiology and neurology, the last major specialty that is most frequently discussed
in relation to Anfal is psychiatry. During her stay in Halabja, Dr. Godsen described the
psychiatric consequences of Anfal as ubiquitous, saying these consequences are visible in
“almost every house and every ward of the hospital” (Godsen, 1998). In a 2006 study of 291
survivors of the Halabja massacre, researchers discovered higher than average rates of
posttraumatic stress disorder and “poor general functioning” (Dworkin et al., 2008, p. 774).
These results were especially significant in the women and the elderly of the sample (Dworkin et
al., 2008). While the elderly participants may have experienced more traumatic violence due to
their age, other researchers suggest that women are particularly vulnerable to traumatization. For
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example, Dr. Hardi provides evidence that there is a gendered experience of the Anfal genocide,
in which women suffered compounding traumatic events like rape and sexual assault (Hardi,
2011). Other studies present children as a greatly impacted population, concluding that 87% of
the children of 45 families sampled in Anfal displacement camps showed signs of posttraumatic
stress disorder (Ahmad et al., 2000).
These scientific results about the widespread and long-term psychiatric implications of
the CW attacks are further supported by studies in Iran and Japan. A series of studies on the
Iranian soldiers of the Iran-Iraq War stated that the veterans dealt with mental health matters
including, but not limited to, depression, anxiety, personality disorders, and behavioral
conditions (Balali-Mood & Hefazi, 2005). In a report that followed psychological symptoms of
victims of the 1995 Tokyo sarin attack, posttraumatic stress disorder was diagnosed in 14.1% of
the 191 participants (Kawana et al., 2001). The Japanese research team also indicated that due to
cultural stigmatization of mental health, which could have led to an underreporting of
posttraumatic stress disorder and depression, it is likely that additional participants suffer from
the somatization of psychological conditions (Kawana et al., 2001).
As actors often choose chemical warfare to not only cause physical harm, but to subdue a
population through psychological fear, these statistics show that it has been successful in its goal
throughout many cases over time (Hiltermann, 2007). While many villages, towns, and cities that
faced the Anfal Genocide were not discussed within these articles, the results of the Halabja
studies, the Tokyo studies, and the Iranian studies can be used a standard of comparison for those
left unresearched. In order to generate international research community interest on the medical
consequences of Anfal, further development of scientifically valid databases and collections of
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medical information are necessary. Once these are in place, studies of the biopsychosocial
complications of Anfal’s chemicals will be able to further progress and to potentially impact the
general well-being of the Kurdish population (Moradi et al., 2019).

Political Literature Review
While the medical consequences of the CW usage during Anfal are well-studied, the
long-term political consequences for Iraqi Kurdistan’s population are significantly less
researched. In fact, the body of literature describing the multifaceted political impact that
chemicals had on the Kurdish future is slim to nonexistent. Although there are very few articles
available on this topic, there is research detailing the effects of Anfal’s chemical warfare on
specific areas that influence politics, such as the economy. Additionally, though the Anfal
Genocide is relatively understudied, other genocides, such as the Rwandan Genocide of 1994,
have been extensively analyzed for political consequences. By supplementing the small amount
of political discussion related to the CW of Anfal with evidence from other cases of genocide, a
political literature review on this topic can be constructed.
The connection between a government and its people is arguably at the root of national
politics. For this reason, governmental documents worldwide, like constitutions, often take great
care to discuss this affiliation. Analyzing how the connection between the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) and its people has been altered due to CW is an important point of political
examination. Shared trauma, such as experiences in wartime violence and the loss of significant
individuals, has been shown to serve as a precursor to intense community bonding (Elder &
Clipp, 1988). This conclusion would suggest that population-wide exposure to CW may be
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responsible for a closer relationship between the KRG and the Kurdish citizens. In fact,
researchers who have studied Anfal in relation to Kurdish nation-building have described Anfal
as the “chosen trauma” that is central to the demands for Kurdish independence and secession
(Baser & Toivanen, 2017).
However, recent studies have shown that the KRG’s methods for handling the
remembrance and outcomes of Anfal have driven a wedge between itself and its people (Watts,
2012). In fact, in 2006, Kurdish students led a large protest in Halabja against the KRG’s policies
regarding the CW legacy. The protest began as a peaceful attempt to block KRG officials from
visiting the monument to the Halabja Massacre; however, after local security fired on the crowd,
it ended with the death of one protestor and the injury of many. Expressing moral outrage, the
protestors burned the Monument of Halabja Martyrs down. Researchers who have analyzed this
outburst of community anger suggest that discrepancy between the speech and actions of the
KRG contributed to this event (Watts, 2012). Specifically, protestors were furious that the KRG
spent money building and maintaining the monument, which frequently saw visits from
international diplomats, instead of applying the money to needs within Halabja (Watts, 2012).
For example, at the time of the protest, most of Halabja lacked basic infrastructure like roads and
nearly half the population had no reliable supply of water (Watts, 2012). A resident of Halabja
summed local tensions by stating that “everybody uses Halabja like a card” and yet, “when it
comes to working in Halabja, nobody does it” (Watts, 2012).
Aside from potential damage to Kurdish political leadership through citizen backlash, the
Anfal Genocide can arguably be tied to the destruction of the Kurdish economy. Although
economy is not an exact representation of a nation’s political situation, financial affairs are
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commonly discussed in political and governmental analyses. As a point of comparison, the
detrimental economic effect of the Rwandan Genocide can be offered. Researchers claim that the
Rwandan Genocide was responsible for a 58% decrease in Rwanda’s GDP the year that it
occurred (Holder, 2019). While no statistics are available on the GDP of Iraqi Kurdistan in
relation to Anfal, it can be inferred that the Iraqi violence caused a decrease in regional
productivity in 1988. This decrease in economic dealings, which the Human Rights Watch
referred to as demolition of Kurdistan’s “traditional rural economy,” presumably had longlasting political effect on the Kurds (Human Rights Watch, 1993). Although the Kurds have
succeeded in other industries, such as their prosperous oil ventures in the early 21st century,
agriculture’s role as the historical basis of Kurdish finances makes its discussion worthwhile
(Noori, 2016).
As referenced by the Human Rights Watch report, Kurdistan at the time of Anfal was a
highly agricultural society. In the early 1980’s, the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq supplied 2530% of Iraq’s total crop production (Eklund et al., 2016). However, through the destruction of
villages, mass-killings, and the forced migrations of survivors, the attacks of Anfal dismantled a
large portion of the prosperous Kurdish agricultural society (Eklund et al., 2016). To be exact,
researchers estimate that post-Anfal there was a 400 square kilometers decrease of winter
cropland, which is the most important growing season for the Kurdish diet (Eklund et al., 2016).
This led to reliance on food imports in the 1990s, and even a United Nations-sponsored Oil for
Food program (Hardi, 2011). Moreover, other studies also suggest that the chemicals of Anfal,
specifically the mustard gas, may have led to a decrease in agricultural soil quality lasting four to
five years (Razavi & Slalamati, 2013). While the alleged soil impact is both temporary and
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contested, if Kurdish farmers believed their crops were experiencing ill-growth, the widespread
depopulation associated with Anfal contributed to the Kurdish urbanization in the 1990s and
further agricultural economic decline (Hardi, 2011).
The chemicals of Anfal not only disrupted the economy through Kurdish industry, but
also through their medical consequences. Firstly, returning an area after an incident of CW usage
to healthy conditions through decontamination is expensive. For example, the clean-up of the
2018 Russian Novichok nerve agent that targeted a former Russian spy in the United Kingdom
cost 7.5 million pounds (BBC, 2018). Since this attack was miniscule compared to the scale of
Anfal, the amount of money needed for a proper recovery from CW in Iraqi Kurdistan would
have been exponentially higher. According to the World Bank’s most recent report on the area,
Iraqi Kurdistan’s GDP per capita in 2011 was $4,452 (World Bank, 2015). As a comparison, the
United Kingdom’s GDP per capita in 2011 was $39,731 (World Bank, n.d.). With knowledge of
how much lower Iraqi Kurdistan’s GDP per capita is compared to the United Kingdom, it is
doubtful that Iraqi Kurdistan could fully handle the extensive long-term costs of Anfal
decontamination the same way that the United Kingdom was able to handle the 2018 Novichok
cleanup.
Secondly, other than the finances of decontamination, the burden cast on the Kurdish
health care system by Anfal is considerable. As mentioned in the medical literature review, the
chronic conditions caused by exposure to CW affect everything from reproduction to psychiatric
well-being. To give a concrete example of how impactful this potentially is, an average cost
analysis of leukemia can be presented. This is relevant to the Kurds, since the rate of
hematological cancers have shown an increase since Anfal (Othman et al., 2011). According to
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researchers on acute myeloid leukemia, the most common type of acute leukemia in adults, the
average treatment cost per patient is around $104,386 (Uyl-de Groot et al., 2004; Mayo Clinic,
n.d.). As a society where hematological cancers and other forms of debilitating chronic
conditions exist at higher rates, the issue of healthcare clearly weighs heavily on Kurdish
pocketbooks.
This literature review on how Anfal directly impacted Kurdish politics is limited due to
lack of research; however, by presenting the effects of chemical warfare on issues that affect
politics, the connection can be indirectly inferred. In a recent poll by Gallup on American voters
in preparation for the 2020 presidential election, both the economy and healthcare jointly ranked
as “extremely important” for at least 30% of participants (Hrynowski, 2020). If American society
views these issues as highly influential to political matters, it is likely that Kurdish society does
as well. Overall, Anfal had various negative impacts of the economy, healthcare, and politics of
Iraqi Kurdistan. As the recent research suggests, there is also a lack of trust among some
segments of Iraqi Kurdistan regarding how the political leadership instrumentalizes the legacy of
Anfal (Watts, 2012).
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
General Methods
As this research is exploratory in nature, it seeks to unveil further questions and areas of
potential research in relation to the long-term medical and political consequences of the chemical
weapons utilized in the Anfal Genocide. In accordance with this goal, there was no specific
hypothesis or set of variables that dictated data collection. Instead, the novel qualitative
information of this research was gathered from semi-structured interviews with participants by
the guidelines below.

Soran University and UCF’s Kurdish Political Studies Program
This research would not have been possible without the relationship between Soran
University and the Kurdish Political Studies Program (KPSP) at the University of Central
Florida. Soran University is a public university in Soran, Iraqi Kurdistan that is sponsored by the
Kurdistan Regional Government. Geographically, Soran is close to the border of Iran and the
Kurdish vacation town of Rawanduz, which is known for its beautiful waterfalls. Due to its role
as a local hub for academics, and its close location to other countries and tourist attractions,
Soran is frequented by people of many nationalities.
The University of Central Florida (UCF) is connected to Soran University through its
position at the forefront of Kurdish studies within the United States. Currently, UCF contains the
only endowed Kurdish studies program in the entire country, known as the Kurdish Political
Studies Program (KPSP). Led by the inaugural Jalal Talabani Endowed Chair, Dr. Güneş Murat
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Tezcür, KPSP seeks to promote academic studies and awareness of the Kurds. One method by
which KPSP realizes its goal is by hosting conferences and events that serve as forums for
domestic and international scholars of Kurdish studies to gather. Among leading Kurdish figures
drawn by KPSP is Dr. Najmaldin Karim, a Kurdish neurosurgeon and former governor of Kirkuk
(2011 – 2017) who sponsors a Kurdish political studies fellowship at UCF.
As a recipient of this fellowship in 2019, the author met many individuals who would
later assist her with fieldwork in Iraqi Kurdistan through KPSP events. Among Soran
University’s faculty, Dr. Kamal Kolo, Dr. Mohammed Hussain, Dr. Nahro Zagros, and Ph.D.
candidate Shorish Mustafa Abdullah were integral figures in the fieldwork this project entailed.
Not only did they aid with the fieldwork transportation and accommodations, but they also
served as a bridge to the local Kurdish community that allowed for participant recruitment.
Without the help of Soran University and the Kurdish Political Studies Program at UCF, this
research would have remained indefinitely incomplete.

Participant Recruitment
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this research, the participants recruited for
interviews came from a variety of backgrounds. The three categories of interviewees were as
follows: political figures, medical personnel, and non-governmental organization activists. By
sampling among different populations, the goal was to cover multiple angles of the medical and
political consequences of Anfal’s chemical warfare. Participants were recruited with the help of
established connections within Soran University and KPSP using the technique of snowball
sampling. Snowball sampling, which relies on initial study participants for the recruitment of
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further participants, is frequently utilized within the realm of Kurdish studies. In fact, the 1993
Human Rights Watch report on Anfal, which serves as one of the most extensive resources on
the topic, operated through snowball sampling as well.
While in Iraqi Kurdistan in July of 2019, the political and the non-governmental
organization interviews were completed. Medical interviews were completed upon return to the
United States over the phone. The difference in circumstance for the interviews is recognized as
a limitation for this research. Over the course of two weeks in Iraqi Kurdistan, the author
networked primarily within a group of Kurdish politicians. For this reason, snowball sampling
was more successful in producing political interviews and non-governmental organization
interviews than medical ones.
Aside from the trouble with snowball sampling, the medical component faced two other
hurdles. Due to lack of regional resources, Kurdistan does not have the medical infrastructure
necessary to completely train doctors of certain specialized areas to Western standards. One area
that is lacking is emergency medicine, which is a classic specialty for doctors with interest in
chemical weapons and other forms of mass-casualty care. This shortage created difficulty in
contacting doctors within Iraqi Kurdistan to interview during the two weeks of fieldwork. As a
solution, a number of international medical professionals with extensive experience working in
Iraqi Kurdistan were interviewed over the phone upon return to the United States.
Lastly, medical interviews were disrupted by the 2020 pandemic caused by COVID-19.
COVID-19 led doctors worldwide to experience a surge in work commitment as it triggered
unprecedented strain on modern healthcare. The first few months of 2020 also served as the
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collection period for the medical interviews of this research, which in turn led to multiple
physicians having to cancel interview intentions related to this project.
Overall, the intended sample size for this research was a maximum of 15 participants,
with five in each of the three professional areas. Although the maximum number was not
reached, with a total of 12 interviews conducted, the sample size is still valuable for the purposes
of this study. If global health events in March 2020 had not disturbed medical interview
appointments, the sample size would total 14 participants. The data and conclusions drawn from
each of the 12 successful interviews can be found in the findings section of this paper.
Table 2. Political Interviews.
Participant Name
Job Description
Baravan Hamdi
Minister of Martyrs
Hussein
and Anfal Affairs
Ayad Kakayi
Head of the
Kurdistan Bar
Association
Shno Jamil Hamalaw Halabja Community
Leader
Omid Abdullah Salah Director of the
Halabja Branch of the
Ministry of Martyrs
and Anfal Affairs
Ashqi Mala Sheroky Director of the Soran
Branch of the
Ministry of Martyrs
and Anfal Affairs

Table 3. Medical Interviews.
Participant Name
Job Description
Gazi Zibari
Transplant Surgeon
Lisa Moreno-Walton Emergency Physician
Lou Smith
Trauma Surgeon

Interview Date
July 9, 2019

Interview Location
Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan

July 9, 2019

Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan

July 10, 2019

Halabja, Iraqi
Kurdistan
Halabja, Iraqi
Kurdistan

July 10, 2019

July 15, 2019

Soran, Iraqi
Kurdistan

Interview Date
February 12, 2020
March 24, 2020
March 29, 2020

Interview Location
Phone Interview
Phone Interview
Phone Interview
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Table 4. NGO Interviews.
Participant Name
Job Description
Rekar Mzoiri
Activist and Writer
Luqman A.
Director of the
Muhammad
Halabja Chemical
Victims Society
Hikmat Fayaq Arf
Halabja Chemical
Victims Society
Member
Ruba Muhamad
Halabja Chemical
Salim
Victims Society
Member

Interview Date
July 9, 2019
July 10, 2019

Interview Location
Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan
Halabja, Iraqi
Kurdistan

July 10, 2019

Halabja, Iraqi
Kurdistan

July 10, 2019

Halabja, Iraqi
Kurdistan

Interview Design
Before constructing interview design, the major barrier that the author had to cross was
that of language. In this issue, Soran University and its student body were exceedingly helpful.
Soran University graciously connected the author with Shawan Saeed, a master’s level English
student who speaks native Sorani Kurdish, to serve as an interview translator. Shawan
accompanied the author to all interviews that took place in Iraqi Kurdistan, and she provided
invaluable help transcribing the interview responses from Kurdish into English. As all the
medical professionals involved spoke fluent English, Shawan’s help was not needed with the
2020 phone interviews that took place in the United States. Shawan’s cousin and Soran
University transportation employee, Rekan Kamal Kchka, drove the research team around Iraqi
Kurdistan as the interview locations were often hours apart. As a solo traveler and an originally
unfamiliar individual to the Kurdistan region, the author was incredibly grateful to have Shawan
and Rekan’s aid with the interview process.
The interviews followed a semi-structured format that began by following IRB-approved
question sets specific to each of the three professional areas, which can be found in Appendix E.
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After the pre-written questions were exhausted, the flexible portion of the interview continued
based on the previous content from the participant. Typically, interviews lasted around 60
minutes. The conversation between the author, Shawan, and the participant was recorded to
allow for referencing during data analysis. The 2020 phone interviews followed the same format,
with the exception of translator usage and face-to-face interaction.
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MEDICAL FINDINGS
Participant Introductions
Dr. Gazi Zibari, a renowned transplant surgeon, was born in the Kurdish village of Bira
Kepra in 1955. As a young adult in 1975, he was forced to walk at least 10 days through the
snowy Kurdish mountains as he escaped to Iran to avoid Iraq’s persecution of the Kurds
following the collapse of the Barzani rebellion. After living in a refugee camp in Iran, he
eventually moved to Nashville, Tennessee through a refugee sponsorship program. In Tennessee,
Dr. Zibari graduated both college and medical school before moving to Louisiana for his surgical
residency. Since then, Dr. Zibari has accumulated awards like the 2007 Ellis Island Medal of
Honor for immense contributions to the United States and the global community throughout his
career.
Among his important contributions is an international medical outreach program serving
the people of Iraqi Kurdistan, which Dr. Zibari founded in 1992 after being able to return home
for the first time due in the aftermath of the First Gulf War. Since its establishment, Dr. Zibari’s
large medical team has grown to include doctors such as Dr. Lou Smith, a trauma surgeon, and
Dr. Lisa Moreno-Walton, an emergency medicine physician. Their goal to improve the Iraqi
Kurdish medical system has even been recognized in Roger Lindley’s 2018 documentary entitled
Kurdish Factor: The Untold Story of The Gulf Wars. Between Dr. Zibari, Dr. Smith, and Dr.
Moreno-Walton, there exists a tremendous amount of expertise on the modern situation of Iraqi
Kurdish healthcare, which made them ideal candidates for the medical interviews of this
research.
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How Chemical Weapons Shaped Iraqi Kurdish Healthcare
While the medical literature review on chemical warfare made it clear that Anfal had
immense impact on Iraqi Kurdish health, an important component of the interviews was to
collect more nuanced and personalized insights about this pattern. Each of the physicians offered
unique takes on the issue, but all three supported the idea that chemical agents had undoubtedly
caused long-term medical consequences for the Kurds. As directed by previous literature, main
areas of interview conversation included topics like cancer, reproduction, and psychiatry.
From the somatic perspective, Dr. Zibari and Dr. Moreno-Walton indicated that they had
perceived higher rates than typical of certain bodily conditions (2020). They both agreed that a
predominant effect of chemical weapons in the Kurdish region has been an observed increase in
cancer cases (2020). Dr. Zibari further elaborated by specifically noting that regional oncologists
are concerned mostly about hematological cancers and lung cancers when in relation to chemical
warfare (2020). Dr. Moreno-Walton additionally offered that birth defects are a problem she
believes the Kurds have become more worried about since the attacks of Anfal (2020).
While these serious health conditions were brought up within the interviews, all three
physicians focused most of their discussion on how Anfal shaped healthcare based on
psychological effect. In Dr. Zibari’s words, “what [the Kurds] need more than anything else is
psychological help” (2020). Dr. Smith was in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2013, for the 25th anniversary of
the Halabja Massacre, and she spoke of the poignancy of the commemoration (2020). At the
same time that the massacre took place in 1988, Kurdish radio stations and media announced for
everyone to go outside (Smith, 2020). Once the car she was in had pulled over, Dr. Smith and the
other individuals in the area stood and faced the direction of the Kurdish town as a striking
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symbol of remembrance (2020). In her thoughts referencing the experience, Dr. Smith said “it’s
uncomfortable to realize there are people that want to exterminate you, I have no clue what that
is like,” adding that for the Kurds it must be a daily “eerie feeling” (2020).
While not every citizen directly faced a chemical attack, it is said that everyone in Iraqi
Kurdistan at least knows someone who did, and that this reality offers a community-wide mental
burden (Smith, 2020). In one of their trips, Dr. Zibari’s team met many people affected by
chemical warfare while traveling throughout the region, including a village that had been almost
entirely exterminated when a wedding celebration was gassed during Anfal (Smith, 2020). The
only survivors, those who had been out of town, struggled with the loss of life as they knew it
upon return (Smith, 2020). For the survivors and their descendants, Dr. Moreno-Walton
expressed that there is a lingering fear similar attacks may await them in the future (2020). Since
the population is “very conscious [Anfal] could happen again,” it is imaginable that the
psychological toll must be high, even in present-day 32 years later (Moreno-Walton, 2020).
The Kurds have seen many incidents of violence since the Anfal Genocide, including the
recent massacres of the Yezidis, a Kurdish-speaking religious minority, by ISIS, which Dr.
Zibari described as “Anfal all over again” (2020). Dr. Moreno-Walton expressed concern that
this historic trail of conflict has not only led to a psychological decline in Iraqi Kurdistan’s
patient population, but also perhaps a psychological decline in their medical providers (2020). In
fact, one of her current research partnerships, which will be discussed later, covers this topic
(Moreno-Walton, 2020). While psychiatrists and other kinds of physicians routinely deal with
stressful events, Dr. Moreno-Walton claims that “the magnitude of community suffering is so
unusually high” in Iraqi Kurdistan, that it could theoretically lead to occupational distress (2020).
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While the results of the research have not yet been completed, projects like this one may
potentially add to the body of work detailing just how significant Anfal has been to Iraqi Kurdish
health since 1988.

What Iraqi Kurdish Healthcare Needs
Upon arriving back in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1992, Dr. Zibari encountered a much different
medical system than the one where he had learned to practice in the United States. In his
interview, he described walking into a hospital that served a patient population of 1,000,000
people, only to find “empty pharmacy shelves” and “nonfunctioning x-ray machines,” among
other sights (Zibari, 2020). By Western standards, many of these deficits still exist in Iraqi
Kurdistan today, as Dr. Zibari estimates the Iraqi Kurdish healthcare system to be “three decades
behind” the ones of the United States and Western Europe (2020). However, as Dr. Zibari
pointed out, when reviewing these shortfalls, it is important to consider how they historically
stem from oppression by the Iraqi regime (2020).
Both prior to Iraqi Kurdistan’s semi-autonomy and after its recognition in Iraq’s 2005
constitution, the Iraqi government failed to provide resources to the Kurds (Zibari, 2020). Per its
constitutional writing, Baghdad should be significantly aiding Iraqi Kurdistan’s finances, but it
has continuously failed to uphold this agreement (Zibari, 2020). To give an exact figure to Dr.
Zibari’s statement, according to Reuters, the Iraqi government should be sending 17% of its
overall finances to the Kurdistan Regional Government annually (Zhdannikov, 2015). In recent
years some negotiations have suggested a lower percentage, around 15%, after the Iraqi
government’s claims that Iraqi Kurdistan’s GDP to population share should be lowered (Rudaw,
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n.d.). Without this money to bolster Iraqi Kurdish healthcare, many patients go underserved, like
children mentioned by Dr. Zibari who only receive some of the expensive chemotherapy courses
their cancers desperately require (2020).
This lack of finances and resources leads to problems for the patient population, which
includes the chemical warfare survivors of Anfal. Both the acute treatment of CW victims in
1988 and their long-term treatment in the 21st century have been affected by these
insufficiencies. Before offering solutions that would lead to improvement in the quality of life
for the Anfalakan, an alternate name for the survivors of Anfal, Dr. Zibari, Dr. Smith, and Dr.
Moreno-Walton helped to iron out exactly what has room for improvement in Kurdish healthcare
(Human Rights Watch, 1993). From an American perspective, this list includes “lots and lots of
things that [Americans] take for granted” (Smith, 2020).
At the root of Iraqi Kurdish healthcare problems, is an underdeveloped medical education
system (Zibari, 2020). As to not be misunderstood, this is not due to any lack of intelligence
within the Kurdish population, but instead the lack of resources typically offered in Western
areas (Moreno-Walton, 2020). For example, in the United States there are national organizations
that handle both the “matching” of medical students into medical specialties, and the
organization and standardization of residency training programs. These same national
organizations do not operate in Iraqi Kurdistan, in fact many areas of medical sub-specialization
are not offered at all for lack of training opportunity (Zibari, 2020). To show how this relates to
the Anfalakan, a reproductive example can be proposed. If a baby is born with operable
congenital anomalies, a family in the United States would likely immediately seek the attention
of a pediatric surgeon. However, in Iraqi Kurdistan, many areas of pediatric surgery sub-
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specialization are either limited in accessibility or nonexistent (Zibari, 2020). The same can be
said about many other medical specialties, like obstetrics and gynecology, that are prevalent in
the Western world (Zibari, 2020).
However, even the physicians who go into functioning medical specialties in Iraqi
Kurdistan, like general surgery, face issues due to lack of supplies (Moreno-Walton, 2020).
Without the tools necessary to perform their jobs to the highest degree, Kurdish doctors will
encounter obstacles when attempting cutting-edge medicine (Moreno-Walton, 2020). For
example, as Dr. Moreno-Walton commented, it does not matter how smart a medical
professional is, if they never have access to ultrasound equipment, they will never know how to
use an ultrasound properly (2020).
Medical tools, and Iraqi Kurdistan’s lack of them, goes beyond handheld diagnostic
devices or surgical appliances. Recognized medical centers, such as a national center for poison
control, are also absent from the area (Zibari, 2020). Not only could a poison control center
resolve common complications like accidental drug ingestion in children, but it could have also
provided support related to the poisonous gases of Anfal and how to treat them (Moreno-Walton,
2020; Zibari, 2020). Many people lost their lives in 1988 during attempts to save themselves, like
washing off their bodies in rivers that had been doused in chemical agents (Kurdistan Memory
Programme, n.d.). Unfortunately, no place like a poison control center was around to educate the
Kurds, leaving one to wonder how many lives it could have saved through medical guidance.
Additionally, as mentioned in the literature review as a limitation, Iraqi Kurdistan lacks
several of the national databases utilized for decision-making and research in modern healthcare
in many countries (Moreno-Walton, 2020; Zibari, 2020). Among the most important missing are
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a national cancer registry and a database that tracks health outcomes related to traffic accidents
(Moreno-Walton, 2020). While these may seem unimportant to the Anfalakan, without
standardized datasets for Kurdish researchers to pull from, the scientific integrity of the research
stemming from the region will continue to be doubted on an international scale (Moreno-Walton,
2020). If reports about the Anfalakan are considered statistically unsound, academic and public
awareness about their chronic health conditions may not spread as far as it could.
Lastly, mentality surrounding medical care also has room for improvement in Iraqi
Kurdistan. In the West, there is an expectation that physicians will promote transparent sharing
of information, good or bad, with their patients. This system of healthcare aims to both hold
physicians accountable and to involve patients in their medical decisions. Historically, these
aspects of a physician’s career were not taking place in Iraqi Kurdistan, due to the presumed
authority of doctors within the community and the subordinate nature of patients (Zibari, 2020;
Moreno-Walton, 2020). Aside from this, Dr. Smith also reports that many Kurdish physicians
disregard general medical practices like wearing masks in operating rooms (2020). But, she
added, before judging the character of medical professionals in Iraqi Kurdistan, it is important to
consider their situation (Smith, 2020). Due to all the violence they have suffered, Dr. Smith
suggested that the Kurds have become “people of the moment,” who “might not worry about
tomorrow since they might not be there” (2020). With this mantra in mind, the tendency of Dr.
Zibari’s health team to worry over physician-patient relationships and good hygiene derives from
the privileged nature of the American healthcare system.
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Potential Solutions and Methods for Improvement
For the healthcare of the Anfalakan and the rest of Iraqi Kurdistan’s population to
improve, Dr. Smith says the ideal solution would be if the Kurds “could be there on their own,”
and that escaping the grasp of Baghdad would “truly help them” (2020). However, after the
failed independence referendum of 2017, this solution seems unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Fortunately, medical routes that would help the Anfalakan exist without the necessity of Kurdish
statehood. For example, the implementation and emphasis of sustainable global health programs,
like the one started by Dr. Zibari, could be an integral solution. The phrase “sustainable” is a
crucial component of this idea as global health programs that do not lead with long-term impact
and ability may do more harm than good (Smith, 2020). According to Dr. Moreno-Walton, there
are three steps that Dr. Zibari’s team follows to act sustainably within Iraqi Kurdish healthcare
(2020). Those steps are 1) to train native Kurdish physicians, 2) to train the “boots on the
ground” workers of the area, and 3) to bring the tools needed for training to Iraqi Kurdistan and
to return to the United States without them (Moreno-Walton, 2020).
While Dr. Zibari’s team does help many patients while in Iraqi Kurdistan, the program is
less about serving individual people than it is “educating the educators” (Smith, 2020). The team
does not stay in Iraqi Kurdistan for enough of the year to make large impact by just seeing
patients the way they would normally, so they extend their reach by exercising the idea of
capacity-building (Smith, 2020; Zibari, 2020). The World Health Organization defines capacity
building as:
“the development of knowledge, skills, commitment, structures, systems and leadership
to enable effective health promotion...[with] actions to improve health at three levels: the
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advancement of knowledge and skills among practitioners; the expansion of support and
infrastructure for health promotion in organizations, and; the development of
cohesiveness and partnerships for health in communities” (2006).
Capacity-building for Dr. Zibari’s team revolves around teaching procedures to native Kurdish
doctors that they would not otherwise have access to due to lack of sub-specialization training
(Zibari, 2020). American medical residents and medical students may accompany the team but
are never supposed to do more than observe, since the teaching is fully focused on native Kurds
(Moreno-Walton, 2020). The argument for this is that global health programs are “not
sustainable if they are not culturally competent” (Moreno-Walton, 2020). Not only do the native
Kurdish physicians know how to practice within their culture, but after Dr. Zibari’s team leaves,
they can further the spread of impact by teaching even more Kurds the same skills in the interim
between outreach sessions (Moreno-Walton, 2020).
This partnership has shown great success in many areas. For example, before a procedure
led by Dr. Zibari in 2004, a living kidney transplant had never been completed in Iraqi Kurdistan
(Zibari, 2020). For reference, the first living kidney transplantation in the United States occurred
in 1954. From a comparative perspective, the time gap is astonishing. To an Anfalakan suffering
from chronic conditions after exposure to CW, the development of the transplantation sector
could theoretically lead to life-altering improvements of health. Dr. Zibari reported that at least
3,000 living kidney transplantations have been successfully completed by those who have
learned from his medical outreach team and its branches of capacity-building (2020). Other
examples of the many procedures and practices taught by the medical outreach team have
included laparoscopic surgery, ultrasound technique, advanced trauma life support classes, and
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lessons on shared decision-making in the physician-patient relationship (Moreno-Walton, 2020;
Smith, 2020).
To further capacity-building on an international level, Dr. Zibari would like to expand the
availability of American medical fellowships to physicians in Kurdistan (2020). When he first
began his outreach in 1992, there had been no Kurdistan-trained physicians within the American
College of Surgeons fellowship program (Zibari, 2020). Since then, there have been at least 35,
but Dr. Zibari would like to see this number grow to cover more surgeons and more specialties
(2020). In his interview, he proposed a model where major hospitals in the United States would
each have one position open at a time for an international medical fellow from an
underrepresented place like Kurdistan (Zibari, 2020). If this were to occur, the number of subspecialized physicians in Iraqi Kurdistan would grow exponentially, and potentially pave the
way to aiding the chronic conditions of the Anfalakan.
As the second step to sustainable global health, the team also works with so-called “boots
on the ground people” (Moreno-Walton, 2020). The identity of these individuals varies within
different communities, but in general they are integral members of a healthcare system who do
not work as physicians (Moreno-Walton, 2020). When asked to give a non-Kurdistan example to
help clarify, Dr. Moreno-Walton described a successful initiative in Uganda launched by the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (2020). In Uganda, communities were
experiencing an abnormally high number of head birth defects that led to mothers with children
stuck in their birth canals (Moreno-Walton, 2020). This incredibly dangerous situation for
mother and child often occurred far from hospitals, and once the patients arrived to doctors the
babies were often found decaying within septic mothers (Moreno-Walton, 2020). As a “boots on
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the ground solution,” the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists partnered village
midwives with Ugandan OBGYNs to teach the midwives the method behind caesarean section
(Moreno-Walton, 2020). As for Iraqi Kurdistan, a substantial place for “boots on the ground”
work is within the emergency response departments, which will be discussed within the next
main section (Moreno-Walton, 2020).
Lastly, as the third step of sustainable global health, Dr. Zibari’s team works to provide
tools to the Kurdish medical professionals they partner with (Moreno-Walton, 2020). While the
tools provided change over time, in the past they have donated things such as an ultrasound
machine through the generosity of the American hospital system (Moreno-Walton, 2020).
However, medical equipment is expensive, and there is a reality that the team “can only do so
much within this context” (Smith, 2020). One way the outreach program offers tools that surpass
traditional financial obstacles, is by collaborating with the Kurds on research projects (MorenoWalton, 2020). Aside from the aforementioned research on provider psychology, Dr. MorenoWalton is currently involved in two other research projects (2020). The first is tracking the
patient outcomes of the transplantation services founded by Dr. Zibari’s team and comparing
them to outcomes in traditional Western fellowship programs. The second is evaluating the
impact of martyrdom on the health of surviving families in Iraqi Kurdistan, which is highly
relevant to the Anfalakan (Moreno-Walton, 2020). By starting projects with researchers, Dr.
Moreno-Walton hopes to expand the capacity-building at the core of the medical outreach team’s
methodology (2020).
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Medical Advice for the Recurrence of Chemical Warfare
From the interviews with Dr. Zibari’s team, a clear takeaway is that expansion of
sustainable medical outreach from the international community would help not only the
Anfalakan, but also the Iraqi Kurdish healthcare system as a whole. As a benefit, their model
does not require Kurdish statehood to function. However, this approach cannot calm the thoughts
that many wonder – what if something similar were to happen again in Iraqi Kurdistan? From
the medical perspective, Dr. Zibari, Dr. Moreno-Walton, and Dr. Smith were asked how the
KRG could better handle another instance of mass casualty on the scale of the chemical warfare
experienced in 1988. Overwhelmingly, their answers pointed to development of infrastructure
within the Iraqi Kurdish emergency medicine division (Zibari, 2020; Smith, 2020; MorenoWalton, 2020).
As President-Elect of the American Academy of Emergency Medicine, Dr. MorenoWalton has extensive knowledge on mass-casualty situations and has served as a lecturer on
chemical weapons (2020). According to her, the most effective step the KRG could take to
prepare would be to “develop an organized incident command center” (Moreno-Walton, 2020).
An ideal incident command center, she continued, would dispatch knowledgeable leaders in
times of disaster who would then provide uniform instructions for the medical community
throughout Iraqi Kurdistan (Moreno-Walton, 2020). If this center correctly performs its duties,
the KRG should see “the least damage, to the least number of people, with the least number of
resources,” as compared to the widespread death that could occur without the center’s leadership
(Moreno-Walton, 2020). As a caveat, solely having an incident command center does not always
result in the minimization of death. This stipulation was added by Dr. Smith when the
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conversation turned briefly to the United States’ handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, which
occupied seemingly every headline at the time of this interview (2020).
This idea of emergency uniformity is something that is lacking, within Iraqi Kurdish
healthcare (Smith, 2020). Dr. Smith’s time as a trauma surgeon abroad supplied anecdotes
supporting this claim (2020). During one of her shifts in an emergency hospital in Erbil, the
capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, a family once drove up to her building with a gunshot wound victim
(Smith, 2020). Moments later, the car sped away after speaking with hospital employees in the
parking lot (Smith, 2020). Dr. Smith was told the patient had been sent away to the hospital that
handled gunshots, since the staff reportedly did not treat them there (2020). As an individual
with both the skill needed to save that patient and the knowledge that “time is of the essence” in
critical medical situations, the incident was understandably frustrating for her (Smith, 2020).
When commenting on the lack of emergency organization, Dr. Zibari reflected again on
Western privilege (2020). He mentioned that it is shocking how Iraqi Kurdistan, an area that has
seen unspeakable violence and countless wars, has not a single hospital that could be classified
as a Level I trauma center by Western standards (Zibari, 2020). Level I trauma centers, which
represent the highest quality of care for emergency situations, can be found all around the United
States. In fact, the University of Central Florida, the home of the Kurdish Political Studies
Program, is a mere 20-minute drive from the nearest Level 1 trauma center. Given the absence of
any recent chemical weapons attacks and genocidal campaigns in Central Florida, the inequality
of the situation is remarkable. Per Dr. Zibari, the imbalance can once again be tied back to Iraqi
Kurdistan’s resource depravation (Zibari, 2020).
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As for a tangible plan to achieve greater emergency services, the doctors highlighted
three areas: a nationwide emergency phone number, ambulances, and hospital organization
(Zibari, 2020; Smith, 2020; Moreno-Walton, 2020). Recently, Kurds gained access to 122, their
equivalent of the American 911, after massive efforts by an Italian aid organization (Smith,
2020). However, the phone number is not accessible to everyone in the region and even if it was
the responsive ability is low (Moreno-Walton, 2020). Not only are there few ambulances and
paramedics, but the standards regulating them in the West do not exist in Iraqi Kurdistan
(Moreno-Walton, 2020). Neither medical equipment nor level of personnel training is universal
within their fleet of emergency vehicles (Moreno-Walton, 2020). In fact, Dr. Moreno-Walton
once recalled watching two ambulance employees get a call for a patient in distress, only for
them to tell the patient that they would come once their tea break was over (Moreno-Walton,
2020). The individuals, who did not have official paramedic training, meant no harm, they
simply did not understand the urgency of the matter and their importance as “boots on the
ground” employees (Moreno-Walton, 2020).
Once the patient has made physical contact with an emergency response team, getting to
the local hospital is a whole new problem (Zibari, 2020). Traffic in Iraqi Kurdistan can be
intense, with little adherence to road rules, and airlifting patients is not an option (Zibari, 2020).
Due to these circumstances, which impair the “golden hour” after traumatic injury that lifesaving maneuvers are most successful in, people frequently pass away on the busy highways
(Zibari, 2020). If the patient were to make it to the hospital, and the right hospital at that, internal
efficiency exists as the next hurdle (Smith, 2020). Dr. Smith stated that Iraqi Kurdish hospitals
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lack operation room organization, leading to the financial waste of misplaced supplies and
complications during surgery when necessary equipment cannot be located (2020).
When reading this litany of barriers to healthcare, the thought of Iraqi Kurdistan facing a
recurrence of Anfal-like conditions is bleak. Since nationwide reform without proper economic
support would be nearly impossible, the idea of a “citizen soldier” take on chemical weapons
defense could be proposed. In this model, the Kurds would be distributed gas masks and other
supplies that may defend against chemical agents with the intention of promoting self-defense
(Moreno-Walton, 2020). Other countries, like Israel, have utilized this method in the past (Zibari,
2020). Though this method may appear more achievable than reform of an entire healthcare
system, Dr. Moreno-Walton does not support it as a means of mass-casualty management (2020).
In distressing times, people often panic or act in ways that subjectively help their family
members over others (Moreno-Walton, 2020). For these reasons, relying on citizens instead of an
objective incident control center may exacerbate fatalities (Moreno-Walton, 2020). If Iraqi
Kurdistan were to implement national restructuring to their emergency services, the
transformation would be an uphill battle and would require support from international allies, but
it could save an invaluable amount of life.
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POLITICAL FINDINGS
Participant Introductions
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) emphasizes the importance of Anfal by
establishing official government positions dealing with the issue. The highest office, the Minister
of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs, is within the Cabinet of Iraqi Kurdistan’s Prime Minister.
Although the Cabinet has since been recomposed, Mr. Baravan Hamdi Hussein held this position
in July of 2019. As the reigning expert on Anfal within the KRG, Mr. Baravan Hamdi Hussein
provided not only a solid foundation for the political findings, but also facilitated the starting
point of the snowball sampling that participant recruitment of this study relied on. An interview
with the Minister of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs on any occasion would have been an Anfal
researcher’s honor, but to have interviewed him on his last day of office was particularly special.
Following the interview of the highest national office on Anfal, this project focused on
regional and topical representatives within the KRG. The directors of the Soran and Halabja
branches of the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs, Mr. Ashqi Mala Sheroky and Mr. Omid
Abdullah Salah respectively, were interviewed for the perspective of local politicians. Alongside
Mr. Omid Abdullah Salah an outspoken community political leader, Mrs. Shno Jamil Hamalaw,
was also interviewed in Halabja. Lastly, to showcase the legal dealings within the political realm
of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Head of the Kurdistan Bar Association and Head Legal Consultant to the
Kurdistan Regional Government, Dr. Ayad I. Kakayi, was questioned.
As the research design of this project stated, interviews fell into three categories: medical,
political, and non-governmental organization (NGO) workers. While the political and NGO
employees did discuss the medical impacts of the chemical warfare during Anfal, the vast
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majority of their conversations focused on politics and topics that fall within the governmental
sphere. Additionally, regarding the physiological component of the medical impacts on
survivors, no new information was presented that has not already been thoroughly discussed
within the medical literature review or the medical findings section. For these reasons, the
political and NGO interviewees have been contained within the political findings of this
research.
The three NGO workers that participated are members of the Halabja Chemical Victims
Society, which operates in Halabja, Iraqi Kurdistan. This organization aims to serve the needs of
the direct survivors and the descendants of the Halabja Massacre in 1988. According to the
interviews, it is the only NGO in Iraqi Kurdistan with this goal (Muhammad, 2019). Those who
contributed to the research discussion were the Head of the Society, Mr. Luqman A. Muhammad,
and two long-term members, Mr. Hikmat Fayaq Arf and Mrs. Ruba Muhamad Salim. Lastly, to
add another view to the NGO interview pool, Mr. Rekar Mzoiri was interviewed for his
contributions as an activist and respected writer on Kurdish genocides.

How Chemical Weapons Altered Iraqi Kurdish Internal Relations
As discussed in the political literature review, the events of chemical warfare during
Anfal influenced the long-term relationship between the KRG and its people. While the previous
research on the attitudes surrounding the Monument of Halabja Martyrs suggested this
relationship was damaged as a result of how the government deals with Anfal (Watts, 2012), the
interviews held with politicians and NGO workers in Iraqi Kurdistan did not overtly support this
viewpoint. When asked if the wishes of the public and the government differ in relation to Anfal,
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Minister Baravan Hamdi Hussein claimed this was not the case (2019). In fact, he stated that
since the Kurdish people formed the KRG, the two entities are one functioning unit and would
not be able to hold different perspectives on the issue (Hussein, 2019). This idea of unity was
echoed by the director of the Soran’s branch of the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs, Mr.
Ashqi Mala Sheroky, who said that the KRG considers the needs of its survivors in every
decision that it makes (2019).
These sentiments highlighted positive affiliation between the KRG and its citizens in
relation to Anfal, but some of the statements recorded in the interviews also presented possible
underlying discord. For example, views on the resources available for the chemical attack
survivors were conflicting. Minister Baravan Hamdi Hussein stated that his office works to
provide financial and medical support to the victims, with Mr. Ashqi Mala Sheroky adding that
monthly salaries are given to the individuals affected throughout Iraqi Kurdistan (2019). While
the notion of the KRG attempting provisions was constant throughout the interviews, the
discrepancies lied in what was actually provided regularly. The matter of the hospital built in
Halabja for the victims of Anfal illustrates this well.
Minister Baravan Hamdi Hussein stressed the hospital, which opened in 2019, as a
method of KRG support for its citizens; however, many people in Halabja are still seeking
medical treatment in other countries (Hussein, 2019; Hamalaw, 2019). Mrs. Shno Jamil
Hamalaw, for instance, makes the arduous journey to Tehran, Iran once every three months for
the treatment of her own chronic conditions caused by the chemical agents of Bloody Friday in
March 1988 (2019). With a newly dedicated hospital constructed in town, the citizens would
ideally receive care closer to home but are prevented from doing so by the hospital’s lack of
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specialized medical professionals and supplies (Salah, 2019). Additionally, the members of the
Halabja Chemical Victims Society indicated that the area of greatest need, psychological
support, has not received as much funding from the KRG as fully somatic conditions
(Muhammad, 2019). Minister Baravan Hamdi Hussein’s details of extensive programs focused
on psychological recovery for the Anfalakan run contrary to these narratives (2019).
Mr. Ashqi Mala Sheroky supplied an important point that helps to contextualize these
inconsistencies by noting that there are major political barriers to the medical care of survivors in
Iraqi Kurdistan (2019). In times when the KRG’s economic position is not doing well, the
government is not realistically able to extend its victims services as far as they would like
(Hussein, 2019). This reality is further impacted by the fact that the Iraqi government has
allegedly not paid a single dollar in reparations for the survivors of Anfal (Luqman, 2019). If
Iraqi Kurdistan’s economy were to flourish, Minister Baravan Hamdi Hussein reported that the
KRG would like to provide housing, education, and medical treatment at no expense to every
Anfalakan (2019).
While some aspects of this ideal scenario are in place in present-day, the current ratio of
chemical attack survivors to Iraqi Kurdish finances prohibits welfare program growth (Hussein,
2019). In the interviews with the politicians and NGO employees, it seemed universally
understood that the KRG does its best to justly address the issue but is essentially caught in a
geopolitical predicament with no easy answer (Salah, 2019). However, with prior knowledge of
the burning down of the Monument of Halabja Martyrs, which has since been returned to its
former shape, it leads one to ponder if the typical Kurdish citizen also understands the
complexity of Anfalakan care and finances. If the average citizen in Halabja fully believed the
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KRG was doing its best to equally and productively distribute survivor funds, it is inconceivable
they would have burned down their town’s own memorial. These actions, which do not fully
match the words and sentiments of the unity expressed in the political and NGO interviews,
suggest the interviews may have contained either an internal professional bias or a greater level
of economic comprehension than an average person in Iraqi Kurdistan would have. Given the
lack of transparency reported in sectors within Iraqi Kurdistan like the oil industry, a divide
between the public and government in financial comprehension would not be surprising (Saeed,
2019).

How Chemical Weapons Impacted Iraqi Kurdish Economy
As was theorized indirectly within the literature review, the political and NGO interview
participants largely supported the concept that the chemical warfare of Anfal had a strong
negative effect on the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan. In his assessment of Anfal, Minister Baravan
Hamdi Hussein claimed that the chemicals were destructive to the potential of prosperity the
region had shown in the 1980s (2019). If the Iraqi violence, which forced the migration of
thousands and destroyed infrastructure along the way, had not occurred, he believes that Iraqi
Kurdistan would be a powerhouse in the industries of tourism and petroleum production
(Hussein, 2019).
The idea of industry interference was commonly voiced within this set of interviews.
Like the researchers in the literature review proposed, Dr. Ayad Kakayi suggested that a highly
influential, yet infrequently discussed, component of the Anfal chemical attacks was the
devastation of Kurdish agricultural society (Kakayi, 2019; Eklund et al., 2016). Aside from the
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fact that Anfal’s chemical violence led to the abandonment of farmland, Dr. Ayad Kakayi
indicated that the chemicals brought stigmatization to the many crops (2019). For example, Dr.
Ayad Kakayi noted that many consumers are unwilling to eat the once popular pomegranates that
grow in Halabja for fear that the chemical agents have made them unsafe (2019). The members
of the Halabja Chemical Victims Society reiterated this concern, saying that they no longer eat
the fruit grown in areas affected by Bloody Friday (Luqman, 2019). This stigmatization of
cropland made the economic recovery for areas that suffered during Anfal even more difficult,
leading to further financial marginalization of victims.
Outside of industry, it was said in the interviews that personal contributions to societal
production are also hindered by the chemical attacks (Mzoiri, 2019). For example, Mr. Rekar
Mzoiri told a story of a woman so deeply psychologically affected after chemical exposure that
she refused to leave her house for 27 years (2019). Mental health consequences this severe
prevent some Anfalakan from working, which would theoretically contribute to the finances of
Iraqi Kurdistan as a whole. Moreover, some families now incur travel expenses when visiting
other countries for medical care (Salah, 2019). These expenses, which stem from Anfal, mean
that families spend money on international travel that could be spent by buying domestically
produced products. This cycle of less personal production and domestic spending, two crucial
components to a functioning economy, undoubtedly casts a shadow on the modern financial
situation of Iraqi Kurdistan.
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How Chemical Weapons Changed the International Relations of Iraqi Kurdistan
Among the political conclusions of the interviews for this research, was one major theme
that had not been suggested by the literature review conducted beforehand. This theme is as
follows: the chemical weapons utilized in the Anfal Genocide contributed significantly to a
decline in the international relations of Iraqi Kurdistan. The deterioration of relationships began
shortly after Anfal ended, when the global response to the genocide was both lackluster and
callous. For instance, when it came time for Saddam Hussein to speak for his war crimes, Dr.
Ayad Kakayi stated that both countries in the Middle East and countries in the West sent lawyers
to defend him (2019). Allegedly, the Middle Eastern lawyers were sent as a demonstration of
unity between Arab countries and leaders (Kakayi, 2019). The Western lawyers, however, were
sent as a means of protecting actions that stemmed from North America and Europe during the
genocide (Kakayi, 2019).
To fuel his production of chemical weapons, Saddam Hussein purchased massive
amounts of chemical precursors from countries including Germany, Spain, England, the
Netherlands, the United States, and more (Kakayi, 2019; Mzoiri, 2019). After the conflict ended,
records of the transactions were revealed that made it clear the chemical companies knew the
buyer was the Iraqi regime at the time of purchase (Muhammad, 2019). It is thought that the
Western lawyers sent to defend Saddam Hussein in his crimes were also meant to cover these
tracks of involvement (Mzoiri, 2019). The fact that many countries of the West have refused to
meaningfully acknowledge that role of their businesses in the Anfal Genocide has soured the
relationship with the Kurds (Muhammad, 2019). It should be conceded that some countries have
worked to acknowledge these dealings, such as the government of the Netherlands, which
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sentenced Dutch businessman Frans van Anraat to 17 years in prison for selling chemical
materials to Saddam’s regime (European Court of Human Rights, n.d.).
In an attempt to seek justice on their own, the Halabja community has held four
courtroom trials against the chemical companies as of July 2019 (Luqman, 2019). While they
have tried to convince the West to bring disciplinary action against these companies, no
representatives of the chemical companies have been mandated to attend these trials (Luqman,
2019). This lack of justice within the Halabja legal system is echoed internationally for the Kurds
since the International Criminal Court (ICC) will not hear the case of the Anfal Genocide
(Kakayi, 2019). Dr. Ayad Kakayi say the ICC refuses to bring the Iraqi regime to trial over Anfal
because it occurred before the court began trying cases in 2002 and the ICC does not try cases
from earlier timeframes by standard policy (2019).
These circumstances in which legal justice has been blocked by international players has
made many Kurds upset with the value system of Western allies (Salah, 2019). When asked
about the matter, Mr. Omid Abdullah Salah stated that the United States must support human
rights and legal justice worldwide if it is going to count it among its national values (2019). The
United Kingdom also falls into this frustration, since they have purportedly allowed members of
the Iraqi military regime to seek asylum since Anfal ended (Kakayi, 2019). To have international
governments recognize or discuss the disasters of Anfal, but to also house criminals and to
legally support their faulty chemical companies is said to deepen the community-wide wound
that was left by Saddam Hussein (Kakayi, 2019).
Amidst this dissatisfaction with other governments is also the reality that the chemical
attacks have increased Iraqi Kurdistan’s reliance on foreign aid. Since Anfal, numerous countries
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have helped with the care of chronic conditions in some way, including Iran, Turkey, Sweden,
Norway, and Germany among others (Hamdi, 2019). In an extreme example of this global care, a
Kurdish man is currently living full-time under German medical supervision due to his need for
artificial respiration (Hussein, 2019; Salah, 2019). While the KRG would like to have the means
to treat its Anfalakan at home, the lack of funds means that they are obliged to send citizens
abroad (Sheroky, 2019). While this system of medical dependence may appear a fully charitable
association, from the Kurdish perspective any form of international dependence could be one
step back on the pathway to statehood.
This thought of Kurdish statehood appeared frequently in conversation with the Kurdish
politicians and NGO employees. While they voiced support for Kurdish independence, the topic
was also used to highlight a double standard characterizing how the international community
dealt with the Kurds. For example, when the Kurds announced intentions to hold an
independence referendum in 2017, the global reaction was harsh and swift (Muhammad, 2019).
Among numerous side effects of the referendum was the closure of Iraqi Kurdistan’s airspace by
the Iraqi government (Muhammad, 2019). In comparison, the global reaction to the Anfal
Genocide, which may have killed as many as 182,000 people, was relatively nonexistent
(Muhammad, 2019). With this as a backdrop to analyze foreign allies, it is understandable that
many of the participants of this research saw the chemical attacks of Anfal as a factor negatively
affecting Iraqi Kurdistan’s international relations.
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Political Advice for the Recurrence of Chemical Warfare
When asked about advice they would give for the potential recurrence of chemical
warfare, the Kurdish politicians and NGO employees offered a distinctly different perspective
than the medical professionals had. All nine of the individuals interviewed for the political
findings were living in the Kurdistan region when Anfal occurred. None of the medical
professionals interviewed can say the same, though Dr. Gazi Zibari did have many family
members in Kurdistan in 1988. Aside from just residing in the region at the time of the genocide,
many of them also lost people close to them in the chemical attacks. For example, 10 members
of Mr. Hikmat Fayaq Arf’s immediate and extended family perished in the Halabja massacre
(2019). Mrs. Ruba Muhamad Salim and Mrs. Shno Jamil Hamalaw, on the other hand, are both
widows from the same attack (2019). With this context established, it makes sense that the
responses generated by this theoretical question were deeply emotional for those nine
participants.
When the idea of chemical warfare recurrence was introduced in the interviews, most of
the participant responses began as Minister Baravan Hamdi Hussein’s did, by emphasizing that
the Kurds never want any area of the world to experience the chemical horrors they suffered
during Anfal (2019). The members of the Halabja Chemical Victims Society stated that anytime
they hear of chemical weapons being used around the world, they feel very emotional for the
victims (Muhammad, 2019). This sense of solidarity with survivors of similar attacks inspired
the NGO to send messages of support and guidance to Syrian towns gassed by the Syrian regime
during the country’s ongoing civil war (Muhammad, 2019).
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As far as strategic planning for the recurrence of chemical warfare, the Kurdish
politicians and NGO employees all heavily favored the idea of actions that fuel deterrence over
actions that focus on acute response to chemical violence. Instead of toying with the idea of
another aftermath, they preferred to offer suggestions as to prevent another instance of chemical
warfare altogether. The first suggestion for this method of deterrence was based in the
International Criminal Court (Hussein, 2019). Minister Baravan Hamdi Hussein would like to
see further development of this global court system through the creation of binding rules that
forbid mass-casualty events like genocide and chemical conflict (2019).
While the court has tried individuals for genocide previously, such as the former dictator
of Sudan Omar al-Bashir for his role in Darfur, certain cases have slipped past the court’s
capacity (BBC, n.d.). Only 123 states are current members of the International Criminal Court,
and Iraq is not among them. An additional limitation is the fact that the court is tied to the United
Nations Security Council. Among the five permanent members of the council, is Russia, which
has been linked to recent chemical warfare in Syria. Although these facts cast a pessimistic
shadow on the court’s efficacy for convictions related to chemical agents, by emphasizing legal
rules and enforceable punishments for their violations, Minister Baravan Hamdi Hussein believes
that potential war criminals would be dissuaded and would not follow through with their plans
(2019). Only through an international response to acts of violence does he predict the world can
achieve a sense of trust and security (Hussein, 2019).
Aside from legal action, activist Rekar Mzoiri tendered education as a supplemental
means to prevent further chemical warfare (2019). According to him, genocide like Anfal has
been around since the beginning of humanity, and the actions taken thus far in history have not
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been enough to put a meaningful stop to it (Mzoiri, 2019). Only by educating children of the
value of humanity above everything else does Rekar Mzoiri believe that events like chemical
warfare could be eradicated by future generations (2019). For the leadership behind this
education, Mr. Omid Abdullah Salah thinks that Western countries that endorse the promotion of
human rights should apply their financial resources to the issue (2019).
If legal and educational methods are not enough to halt potential chemical warfare, Mr.
Ashqi Mala Sheroky says the best thing a community can do to recover from severe chemical
bombardment is to maintain a sense of national unity as the Kurds have post-Anfal (2019). The
mindset of unity, Mr. Ashqi Mala Sheroky asserted, is powerful enough keep a community afloat
during trying times (2019). In all nine of the interviews that serve as content for the political
findings, only a single positive thing about the chemical attacks of Anfal was said. In his
seemingly unexpected statement, Mr. Ashqi Mala Sheroky concluded that although Anfal altered
the fabric of Kurdish society, through its consequence of increased unity it has also helped Iraqi
Kurdistan achieve a spotlight on its desire for freedom that may not have existed before (2019).
This comment supports the earlier notion that Anfal is central to Kurdish aspirations for
independence.
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LIMITATIONS
Within the design of this research there are multiple possible sources of limitations,
which are largely based around the literature review and the interview process. As
aforementioned, scientific databases that provide statistically valid foundations for medical
research in Iraqi Kurdistan are underdeveloped. While the Kurdish researchers cited within this
paper have adapted their research methods in hopes of minimizing sources of error, it should be
recognized that the standards for peer-review in Kurdish academic journals may not meet
standards of academic journals abroad. In terms of impact to this research, this limitation likely
affected the medical literature review, which in turn may have influenced interviews as it
informed the questions asked to the medical professionals of the project.
The actual interview process is the source of greatest limitation within this research
design. The author of this paper does not speak Kurdish, and so a translator was necessary for the
interviews that took place with participants without fluency in English. In total the translator was
utilized in nine of the 12 interviews, with the three medical interviews, which were conducted in
English, not requiring translation services. It is possible throughout the translation and
transcription services that personal biases may have been added to interpretation and that the
interviewer may have had greater success connecting to the conversations she could follow by
herself. For these reasons, the depth of the political and NGO interviews may have suffered as
compared to the depth of the medical interviews.
Lastly, participant recruitment offers other research limitations. Within a total of 12
interviews, three were medical, four were NGO, and five were political. As previously
mentioned, this uneven distribution was altered by the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, which
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prevented multiple medical professionals from following-through with participation in the
interview process. Also, by IRB mandate, this project was only approved to speak to individuals
in a professional capacity. As per this rule, the interview team did not reach out to citizens within
Iraqi Kurdistan who do not serve a role with ties to the chemical attacks of Anfal. With the
absence of feedback from typical Kurdish citizens, the professional information received through
the interviews may not be representative of the usual Kurdish perspective.
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As this research is exploratory by design, its completion likely warranted more questions
than it answered. There is much potential for further research within both the medical and
political dimensions of this project. From the medical perspective, long-term tracking of chronic
conditions through reputable and statistically valid databases could warrant new research
questions relating exposure to chemical weapons to cancer, birth defects, and other medical
conditions. Also available for future research is the structure presented by Dr. Zibari’s team for
sustainable outreach and improvements to Iraqi Kurdistan’s emergency response capacity. If
enough resources and professional guidance were available, implementing the planned changes
to medical infrastructure suggested by Dr. Zibari, Dr. Moreno-Walton, and Dr. Smith at a single
hospital and tracking the resulting comparative outcomes over time would be a worthwhile
endeavor. If Dr. Zibari’s team and other medical outreach groups continue research-based
development within the Iraqi Kurdish healthcare system, hopefully more academic interest will
develop on this topic within the global health community and some of these projects may one
day come to fruition.
Completing potential research related to the political analysis of this project is likely
heavily reliant on the dynamics of Kurdish autonomy and power over time; however, multiple
areas of further political inquiry do exist. Survey research among ordinary Kurds would offer
insight into the public’s perception of the KRG and its services for the survivors of chemical
attacks. From a quantitative standpoint, economic assessments estimating how much productivity
and money were lost in certain industries like agriculture would be difficult to execute; however,
this research could shed light on the future finances of areas like Syria that have recently gone
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through chemical attacks. Lastly, additional research on how chemical warfare and other acts of
genocide affect international relations would bring greater depth to the political findings of this
research project. Unfortunately, this would require the compliance of international research
participants, and with the current state of geopolitics it is unlikely that Iranian, Iraqi, Turkish,
and Syrian politicians would be willing to participate. This reality bears the harsh truth the much
of Kurdish research is limited in many ways by the politics of the Middle East. With this in
mind, the development of new political research with ties to this project will likely be reliant on
the changes in Kurdish sovereignty that may occur in the coming years.
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CONCLUSION
The Anfal Genocide, which was led by Saddam Hussein’s regime against the region’s
Kurdish population, was highly destructive to the area known today as Iraqi Kurdistan through
traditional artillery and chemical attacks. Generally, the significant loss of Kurdish life due to
Anfal is acknowledged as the major consequence, while medical and political consequences of
the chemical weapons are seldom considered. As a population that has recently experienced
widespread chemical warfare, the Kurds provide a unique and valuable setting to study the longterm influence of chemical agents. This topic continues to be relevant to contemporary affairs
because chemical weapons are still utilized in present-day, such as in the ongoing civil war
within Syria. By researching this topic now, the results could theoretically help populations that
may face similar issues in the future.
The interviews with medical professionals, politicians, and NGO employees provided
unique insight into the medical and political legacy of chemical weapons in Iraqi Kurdistan. Dr.
Gazi Zibari’s medical outreach team illuminated the deficiencies within Anfalakan healthcare,
the historical reasons behind the inadequacies, and a plan for emergency infrastructure
development that could reduce loss of life if an attack similar to Anfal were to occur again.
Politicians like Minister Baravan Hamdi Hussein and non-governmental organizations like the
Halabja Chemical Victims Society, on the other hand, helped to evaluate the political challenges
faced by the Kurds as a consequence of Anfal. These challenges included economic decline
through agricultural stigmatization and decreased individual productivity and reduced Kurdish
self-reliance through increased dependency on foreign medical aid. Following these discussions,
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the political and NGO participants also suggested further development of global legal
repercussions and education as a means of preventing future chemical genocide.
The severe medical and political effects of Anfal outlined in this research help to
contextualize the complexities of Iraqi Kurdistan’s desire for freedom through independent
statehood. As this exploratory research reported the modern dilemmas faced by the Kurds as a
result of Anfal’s chemical warfare, it also shed light on the vast need for academic research and
international awareness of Anfal-related obstacles within Iraqi Kurdistan. With knowledge of
these consequences, the current state of Kurdish affairs can be analyzed from a more historically
enlightened perspective.
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